In just two and a half years, the mix and volume of the European Union's gas imports have shifted substantially. The main supplier – Russia – has to a large degree been cut out of the mix, and import volumes are lower because of declining EU gas demand (McWilliams and Zachmann, 2024). However, the EU still relies heavily on gas imports. This is especially the case because EU domestic gas production dropped by more than a third (36 percent) between 2020 and 2023, driven by reductions from the largest producer, the Netherlands (IEA, 2022). The domestic decline is expected to continue with no significant near-term increase in the production of EU green gas, including biogas and biomethane.

In this context a new assessment is needed of emerging strategic threats to EU gas imports. As the EU gas import mix changes, new risks emerge and mapping them is essential. For this mapping, EU policy goals including friendshoring, derisking, climate objectives, transport modes and interdependency must be taken into account.

The changing geography of EU gas imports

Between 2020 and 2023, the share of Russian gas in EU gas imports dropped from around half to 15 percent (Figure 1). Norway is now the main external gas supplier to the EU, delivering most of its gas via pipelines. Liquified natural gas (LNG) from the United States now competes with Russian gas for second place on the EU market. New sources including Egypt ¹ Mostly reexporting Israeli gas. , Angola and Oman and increasing imports from Azerbaijan have made the EU gas import mix more diversified.

EU dependence on imports carried across seas and oceans has increased. In 2022 and 2023, most EU gas imports came via offshore pipelines through the North, Mediterranean and Baltic Seas, from countries including Norway, Algeria and Libya, or by LNG tanker from the US, Qatar and Egypt (Figure 2, first map, gas exports). Almost 80 percent of gas imports arrived via sea in 2022, increasing to 87 percent in 2023. Azerbaijan is the only supplier (apart from Russia) sending gas via onshore pipelines ² South Caucasus and TANAP pipelines passing through the Caucasus and Turkey. .

While a greater share of gas imports by sea reduces reliance on transit countries, some transit countries remain important for the EU. EU countries still import significant Russian gas volumes via the Ukraine pipeline. Turkey’s transit role expanded with the TurkStream pipeline, rising flows from Azerbaijan and LNG re-exports. The United Kingdom also maintains a strong transit role.

Recently, more countries have developed LNG production and export capacities, reducing dependence on a single country for LNG imports (Figure 2, second map, gas production). However, the rising EU seaborne gas imports present new risks, such as choke points for LNG in the Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz ³ With most of the rest going to the UK. . Ensuring the security of maritime trade and offshore infrastructure is increasingly important, as highlighted by incidents such as suspected sabotage in late 2023 of the Balticconnector gas pipeline ⁴ Claudia Chiappa and Pierre Emmanuel Ngendakumana, ‘“Everything indicates” Chinese ship damaged Baltic pipeline on purpose, Finland says’, Politico, 1 December 2023, .  and the 2022 Nord Stream explosions ⁵ Nerijus Adomaitis and Johan Ahlander, ‘Nord Stream: What’s known about the mystery pipeline explosions?’ Reuters, 7 February 2024, . , both of which disrupted gas supplies and exposed the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure.

More imports from exporters that also serve non-EU countries expose the EU to greater global competition. While Norway (like Algeria) directs almost three-quarters of its gas exports to the EU via pipeline ⁶ With most of the rest going to the UK. , this pattern does not apply to other exporters. In 2022, the US sent about 30 percent of its gas exports to the EU; Qatar sent just 15 percent. In 2022, the EU was the fourth largest global market for gas, following the US, Russia and China (Figure 2, third map, gas consumption). However, the combined gas consumption of Southeast and South Asian countries, excluding China, is almost 40 percent greater than the EU’s.

Access to global reserves

Despite limited access to the world’s largest gas reserves in Russia, the EU potentially has access to largely untapped reserves in the Arabian Peninsula and Central Asia, including Iran and Turkmenistan (Figure 3). However, accessing these reserves is challenging because of insufficient infrastructure, high domestic demand (in Iran, for example), proximity to large demand centres such as Turkey and China and complex geopolitics, particularly in Iran.

However, major producers including Qatar and the US have significant capacity to increase production. The challenge of developing new routes to untapped gas highlights the importance of the EU continuing to import gas from them.

Balancing objectives

As EU gas demand decreases, EU countries can theoretically become more selective about where they buy gas. In this respect an assessment should be made of risks to the EU’s gas supply security and non-price benchmarks can be applied to future import decisions. These should take into account strategic criteria of friendshoring, derisking, limiting climate impact, transport mode and interdependency (Figure 4). We discuss these criteria in turn. Our assessment shows that meeting these multiple criteria will be challenging without a sharp further decrease in demand.

Criteria 1: Friendshoring

Should the EU rely on natural gas imports only from countries that share its fundamental values (based on their political systems and corruption levels, Figure 4). In terms of political systems, the EU can avoid reliance on the most authoritarian regimes of Libya and Russia, and reduce dependence on Azerbaijan, Egypt, the UAE and Oman. As of 2023, the EU can meet approximately 80 percent of its gas needs from countries classified as full democracies, flawed democracies and hybrid regimes, with only half of the supply coming from full democracies (Norway ⁷ Note that according to the EIU Democracy Index 2023, the US is a flawed democracy. ). In relation to corruption, the EU could meet all its gas import needs from countries with corruption perception scores of 58 or higher, where 100 signifies a very clean regime.

Therefore, better aligning gas imports with democracy and corruption criteria would be possible, while maintaining current import volumes.

Criteria 2: Derisking

Another EU goal is to derisk its gas import structure to ensure stable and depoliticised gas supplies. A major risk is Russia potentially exploiting relationships with other gas suppliers to harm EU interests. The EU aims to stop all Russian gas imports by 2027 but this is not a legally binding goal, and the EU may still have to engage with exporters tied to Russia.

The voting behaviour of gas exporters during the United Nations emergency session in February 2023, which called for Russia to withdraw military forces from Ukraine, may indicate their alignment with Russia. Membership of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF), a twelve-member grouping that to some extent coordinates the gas export policies of member nations, including Russia and Iran, also suggests a risk of potential alignment with Russian interests. While 2023 EU gas demand can be met by countries supporting the resolution, meeting current or 2030 IEA projected needs without supplies from GECF members is not feasible. This suggests a strategy is needed to de-risk trade relations with the main GECF suppliers in the short to medium term.

Criteria 3: Climate

Methane, the main component of natural gas, is emitted from oil and gas infrastructure ⁸ Despite increased data on methane emissions, estimates remain uncertain due to varying methods, data quality and assumptions. . It accounts for about a third of net global warming. The EU aims to minimise the climate impact of its gas industry and gas imports and has adopted a methane regulation placing a general methane emissions reduction obligation on operators ⁹ See European Commission news announcement of 27 May 2024, ‘New EU Methane Regulation to reduce harmful emissions from fossil fuels in Europe and abroad’, .  alongside obligations to monitor and report methane emissions from domestic and imported sources and to set methane emissions limits for gas imports starting in 2030. The EU also supports the Global Methane Pledge, in which 157 countries have committed voluntarily to collectively reduce global methane emissions.

We calculated the methane intensity of gas production in different countries by dividing methane emissions in million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent by gas production in exajoules (MMTCO2e/EJ). The results show that methane intensities of gas production vary hugely. The reasons for this are not clear but nevertheless, the EU can prioritise imports from lower methane-intensity exporters (see also IEA, 2024). To meet gas demand (assuming the same level as 2023) while minimising methane emissions, the EU should prioritise gas imports from Trinidad and Tobago (0.0002 MMTCO2e/EJ), Norway (0.025), Qatar (0.226), Oman (0.422) and the US (1.908). If gas demand decreases as forecast by the IEA, and EU domestic gas production remains at 2023 levels, the EU would no longer need US gas. This would mean importing from sources at the methane-intensity level of Oman or lower, (about a fifth of the US intensity level).

The deeper EU gas demand and gas import needs are cut, the easier it will be to obtain gas from more climate-friendly sources.

Criteria 4: Transportation

Importing gas via pipelines offers several advantages compared to tankers, including supply stability, predictability, lower emissions and cost-effectiveness. Pipelines create interdependency by directly connecting suppliers and consumers, reducing the risk of supply diversion. Pipelines are also essential for landlocked countries such as Austria and Hungary. However, relying on pipelines brings country-specific risks. Geopolitical events might disrupt supply via indirect pipelines transiting through third countries including Ukraine or Turkey; additional tariffs could also become payable. LNG routes offer more flexibility and can be changed easily. LNG is already taking a larger share of EU gas imports, up from 35 percent in 2022 to 42 percent in 2023.

The EU can theoretically meet its current gas demand while avoiding the risks associated with transportation through the Suez Canal. LNG could be imported from non-Russian exporters taking Atlantic routes, including from Algeria, Egypt, Norway and more distant suppliers including Angola, Nigeria, Trinidad and Tobago, Peru and the US. However, longer routes around Africa involve logistical challenges. If Middle East conflicts subside, importing LNG from Qatar could become more cost-effective and quicker than from distant Atlantic countries.

Criteria 5: Supplier dependence on the EU market

Before the full-scale war in Ukraine, most EU gas demand was covered by sources that were highly dependent on the EU’s gas market. Norway and Russia both sent about 70 percent of their gas exports to the EU. This interdependence led to multilevel cooperation and engagement in each other’s gas sectors and was particularly evident for Germany.

The gas crisis, triggered by the sharp cut in Russian gas supplies, ended the previously dominant model of cooperation with major partners. It validated concerns, particularly in central and eastern Europe, that interdependence would increase risks when a major supplier defies market logic. EU market players have now diversified their sources, importing from suppliers less dependent on the EU market. In 2023, over 70 percent of EU demand could theoretically be met by supplies from sources exporting over 70 percent of their own gas to the EU. Yet the role of suppliers less reliant on the EU market, including the US (29 percent of its gas exports), Qatar (15 percent) and Oman (4 percent), is growing.

The lack of dependence on the EU of smaller gas exporters might be reflected in less commitment to the EU, especially if long-term contracts do not underpin the supply.

Conclusion

How the criteria we have outlined are prioritised could influence the future mix of EU gas imports without Russian gas. Worrying about democratic performance or corruption levels in exporting countries could imply choosing between LNG imports from Nigeria, Peru and Angola, or the UAE and Oman. However, the EU cannot import all the gas it needs from countries outside the GECF.

Simultaneously, if the EU achieves lower demand levels, a more derisked import basket could be achieved, relying mainly on allies including Norway and the US. However, this implies trade-offs in terms of greater supply concentration and higher methane intensity from US gas.

Strictly applying multiple criteria is therefore challenging. Instead, the EU could reduce natural gas imports drastically through alternative energy, energy efficiency and increased EU gas production. However, reliance on alternative sources has its own security and competitiveness implications.

Hence, choosing alternative sources involves trade-offs, which need to be balanced with new vulnerabilities of diversified gas supply, such as the security of maritime routes and dependence on suppliers less tied to the EU market.

Currently, the gas import mix is largely determined by market forces. The decisions of companies and not national strategic policy goals, let alone EU-level decisions, largely shape where Europe’s gas imports come from. Prices of course (which we have not discussed) will continue to play a predominant role in determining the import mix. Nevertheless, recent experience indicates the need for more careful monitoring and foresight, and possibly for developing a more explicit EU gas import policy supported by legislation.

The EU could set a maximum level of dependence on any single import source alongside existing requirements in the Gas Supply Security Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/1938), which aims to ensure that countries have enough gas infrastructure to meet demand even if their largest supply source is disrupted. It is also critical to develop clear pathways and instruments to credibly limit or end Russian gas imports, and to address the EU’s increased dependence on gas supplies via the seas. Moreover, setting multiple, overly strict criteria may limit trade options with international partners and reduce the EU’s bargaining power.

The Gas Supply Security Regulation is scheduled for revision in 2025 to adapt to changes in the gas market. It will respond to emerging security challenges arising from the decarbonising of the EU’s gas market and from the shifting import structures because of the war in Ukraine. This revision presents an opportunity to reevaluate new dependencies and mitigate the associated risks.

References:

IEA (2022) How to avoid gas shortages in the European Union in 2023: Baseline European Union gas demand and supply in 2023, International Energy Agency, available at 

IEA (2024) Global Methane Tracker 2024, International Energy Agency, available at 

McWilliams, B. and G. Zachmann (2024) ‘European natural gas demand tracker’, Bruegel Datasets, first published 5 October 2022, available at /dataset/european-natural-gas-demand-tracker