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How can Europe accelerate its rearmament without breaking the bank?

Publishing date
22 April 2025
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Europe faces a dilemma. It must take much greater responsibility for European defence, requiring fast rearmament in the short term, and a stronger defence-industrial base in the medium and long term. But Europe’s defence market is fragmented along national lines, and the scale of European arms production is low. This will make rearmament expensive and slow, and force us to purchase more arms from outside Europe than would be good for the development of the European defence industrial base. 

Europe’s rearmament efforts are also constrained by fiscal fragmentation. European democracies with shared defence interests should be building common assets that can benefit all, including common air defence, military satellites and transport capacity. These assets could complement those currently provided by the United States and offer insurance if the US significantly reduces its role in European defence. But they are too expensive for any individual European country.   

In a recent Policy Brief, we argue for a single defence industrial market in Europe. This would increase competition, encourage entry and raise production scale. Creating such a market for the EU is impossible, because this would require unanimity among EU countries. But it could be done through intergovernmental treaty. This treaty could also create a ‘European Defence Mechanism’ (EDM) that would fund Europe-wide common defence assets.  

The EDM would be open to all European democracies, who would own shares in proportion to capital subscriptions. It would issue bonds to fund common defence assets, which be owned by the EDM. It would also undertake joint procurement in specific areas. In joining the EDM, countries would commit not to procure nationally in these areas or discriminate against other EDM members in their national procurement.  

This structure is ambitious. Its creation raises many questions, some of which we answer in a Q&A. But it is far more realistic than creating a new EU funding structure similar to the  (RRF), or enacting EU Treaty change to create a single EU defence market. And it would have the great advantage that it could include all European democracies with a shared defence interest. 

The Why Axis is a weekly newsletter distributed by Bruegel, bringing you the latest research on European economic policy. 

About the authors

  • Jeromin Zettelmeyer

    Jeromin Zettelmeyer has been Director of Bruegel since September 2022. Born in Madrid in 1964, Jeromin was previously a Deputy Director of the Strategy and Policy Review Department of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Prior to that, he was Dennis Weatherstone Senior Fellow (2019) and Senior Fellow (2016-19) at the Peterson Institute for International Economics, Director-General for Economic Policy at the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (2014-16); Director of Research and Deputy Chief Economist at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2008-2014), and an IMF staff member, where he worked in the Research, Western Hemisphere, and European II Departments (1994-2008).

    Jeromin holds a Ph.D. in economics from MIT (1995) and an economics degree from the University of Bonn (1990). He is a Research Fellow in the International Macroeconomics Programme of the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), and a member of the CEPR’s Research and Policy Network on European economic architecture, which he helped found. He is also a member of CESIfo. He has published widely on topics including financial crises, sovereign debt, economic growth, transition to market, and Europe’s monetary union. His recent research interests include EMU economic architecture, sovereign debt, debt and climate, and the return of economic nationalism in advanced and emerging market countries.    

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