First glance

On tech regulation, the European Union should be bolder

The EU should stop apologising for its tech laws, promoting instead their stabilising and fair-competition aspects

Publishing date
20 February 2025
u

Part of the Trump administration’s shock therapy for the European Union-United States relationship is a push to , to unleash the sector’s potential. This is a goal that is of course aligned with US big-tech interests. At the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, US Vice President J.D. Vance accused European countries of curbing free speech through . Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg has proposed to equate antitrust fines to tariffs: a suggestion that is likely to resonate with the Trump administration, based on what we know about its trade policy so far.

At least officially, the European Commission has no plans to ease off on tech enforcement. But it has made no secret of its intention to pause tech regulation and reduce the compliance burden. In a , EU Digital Commissioner Henna Virkkunen’s promised a “more innovation-friendly” regulatory framework for artificial intelligence, instead of pushing back against unwarranted interference.

More generally, whenever EU regulation is brought up, the Commission is on the defensive. From a political point of view, this attitude erodes the Commission’s credibility, making the EU seem weak, as if it must justify itself for slowing down the world’s innovation engine. But rather than apologising, the Commission should flip the narrative.

Concerns about over-regulation are overblown. The relative weight of the EU regulatory burden among other growth-hampering factors is limited. For European companies the first barrier to investment is the lack of availability of skilled staff (a major obstacle for 51% of respondents), according to the . Then comes energy costs and uncertainty (46% and 44% respectively). Regulation is only fourth (32%). Moreover, most of the compliance burden likely originates in national, not EU legislation.

On the contrary, at EU level, there are concerns about under-, not over-, enforcement. Take merger control. In the last 25 years,  in the EU at both industry and market levels, while business dynamism has declined. Only  (0.3%) notified to the Commission between 2000 and 2024 were prohibited. Telecoms is among the most vocal industries arguing for even weaker enforcement of merger control to promote infrastructure investment. However, on many counts – low prices, quality and coverage – European telecoms markets fare better than the US counterparts, where a lax regulatory approach grants significant market power to incumbents (, fibre coverage in the EU was 56%, compared to 49% in the US, and in 2023, the EU had more than ).

Similarly, EU antitrust enforcement has been slow and inefficient. The Commission, for example, took  to rule in the Google Shopping case – an eternity for the digital economy. The need for speed in handling market-power abuse by online platforms was one reason for the EU’s specific regulatory framework in this area – the  (no company has been sanctioned for a DMA infringement yet).

Of course, the EU regulatory framework is far from perfect. The general data protection regulation, for example, could be revised to address the disproportionate burden it imposes on entities relative to their potential to harm privacy (arguably, smaller companies should not have comparable duties to large tech players). But overall, the case in support of US accusations of over-regulation is weak.

On tech regulation, the Commission should go on the offensive, and capitalise on its new battery of tech laws to show that the EU digital environment is stabler, more resilient and cooler than the American one. When many US citizens started using DeepSeek, serious concerns emerged about how. The US does not have good tools to handle privacy risks. The EU does, and it should advertise them more.

The Commission should intensify antitrust enforcement and merger control, and emphasise the role of competition to spark more, not less, innovation. It should apply the DMA and the  as strictly as possible, show that the laws have teeth and that the EU can bite. It should complement the  as necessary (for example, on the use of AI in the workplace) and should build a sturdy ethical framework to underpin the new technological infrastructure before it is too late.

In the long term, a refined, duly-enforced regulatory framework will bring strong competitive advantages, reduce uncertainty and make the EU digital economy a more attractive place to be. Such an environment would no doubt look appealing to foreign talent. Arguably, it could be especially appealing to an American skilled workforce .

This First glance was also published on in French.

About the authors

  • Mario Mariniello

    Mario Mariniello is a Non-resident fellow at Bruegel since September 2024. He is Visiting Professor at the College of Europe in Natolin, Poland, and formerly taught at the University of Namur, the Université Libre de Bruxelles, and the University of Florence. He is the author of "Digital Economic Policy", Oxford University Press 2022. 

    His main interests are the economics of digital marketscompetition policy and the impact of technology in labour markets.

    Mario was previously a Senior Fellow at Bruegel, where he launched and led the “Future of Work and Inclusive Growth” project. He also previously led Bruegel's digital and competition policy research agenda.

    He was Digital Adviser at the European Political Strategy Centre (EPSC), a European Commission in-house think-tank that operated under the authority of the former Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, a member of the Chief Economist Team at DG Competition (the Commission’s antitrust department), and worked on the use of AI in workplaces at the Commission’s DG Employment.

    Mario holds a Ph.D. in Industrial Organization from the European University Institute (Florence) and a M.Sc. in Economics from CORIPE (Turin). He is currently pursuing a bachelor degree in Philosophy at KU Leuven.

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