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Non-Technical Summary

estimate of the stabilisation gain from an increase in government size and find that it decreases as the size of government grows. Specifically, we find that a one percentage point increase in the size of government is unlikely to yield a reduction in output volatility exceeding 0.1 percentage point once public expenditures reaches around 40% of GDP. This suggests that the impact of a marginal change in the size of government is bound to be very small for most countries in the euro area.

Government Size and Output Volatility:
Should We Forsake Automatic Stabilisation?[*]

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1. Introduction

significantly to the decrease of output volatility witnessed in Europe and in the United States after World War II, when the size of governments increased substantially on both sides of the Atlantic. Hence it was hoped that improved national fiscal policy could partly make up for the loss of monetary policy in stabilising national macroeconomic conditions.

That said, of the three traditional goals of public finances detailed by Musgrave (1959), macroeconomic stabilisation is arguably "residual," in the sense that it is only a by-product of choices regarding the size, the structure and the financing of government spending that are dictated by either efficiency or distributive considerations. This led to concerns that euro area countries would actually be torn between the need to ensure adequate macroeconomic stabilisation and the reduction in the size of governments that often accompanied efforts to boost market efficiency and promote long-term growth. EMU countries would thus face a difficult trade-off between maintaining large governments to ensure sufficient automatic fiscal stabilisation and leaner ones to ensure efficiency and growth: in EU jargon, there could be a tension between the 'Maastricht' and the 'Lisbon' goals (Buti et al., 2003).

the economic literature on the determinants of output volatility and its link with government size. Two separate strands of the literature are surveyed: cross-country studies focusing on OECD members and time-series studies of a single country, typically the United States. The cross-section studies confirm that countries with large governments tend to enjoy less output volatility, but also that there may be a threshold level beyond which the negative relationship disappears or even reverses. The studies that focus on the United States show, however, that the country has recently experienced an important reduction in output volatility, despite probably lying below this threshold and having witnessed a less pronounced increase in government size than most OECD countries. This suggests that something other than automatic stabilisation has been at work: an exogenous fall in volatility, an increase in market-based stabilisation, or an improvement in monetary policy.

Section 4 shows descriptive evidence on the size of government, macroeconomic volatility and the role of fiscal stabilisation policies in supporting consumption smoothing in the OECD countries, including 11 euro area members. The evidence confirms the contrast between time-series and cross-sectional studies. The main finding, however, is that the negative correlation between government size and output volatility, which is a major finding of the literature, seems to vanish for more recent cross-country data. In the traditionally volatile, small government countries, volatility has decreased substantially while government size has grown less than elsewhere.

Section 5 builds on these stylised facts to present new econometric estimates of the relationship between government size and output volatility using both time-series and cross-country information. We first confirm that the traditional link between government

size and macroeconomic volatility disappeared during the 1990s. We then explore

possible reasons for this breakdown, focusing on the role of improvements in the quality

of monetary policy and on progress in financial development. The evidence suggests that

monetary policy and financial development can both be substitutes for government size as

a stabilising force, and that once this substitutability is taken into account, the relationship

between government size and macroeconomic stability remains strong, though non-linear:

the marginal effect of an increase in government size on output volatility is found to be

negligible for public expenditure levels above 40 percent of GDP. Conclusions and policy

implications are given in Section 6.

2. Does Volatility Matter? Does Government Matter?

The Musgravian perspective of the 1960s took it for granted that more stabilisation is always better and that delivering it is the job of governments. Both of these assumptions deserve discussion.

The Keynesian paradigm of the times assumed that the private economy is inherently unstable and that output volatility involves significant economic costs. A bigger government could perhaps imply microeconomic inefficiencies but it was regarded as a macroeconomic blessing because it contributes to stability. As James Tobin reportedly said, "it takes a lot of Harberger triangles to fill an Okun gap".

aversion (see for example Otrok, 2001, for a survey). The empirical literature on the relationship between volatility and growth has also suggested that volatility may have detrimental effects on long-term growth (Ramey and Ramey, 1995), at least for countries where financial markets are not fully developed (Aghion et al., 2006).

The purpose of the present paper is more modest than assessing the welfare consequences of economic fluctuations. We only seek to examine the impact of government size on economic fluctuations. However, bearing in mind that what matters ultimately is the welfare consequence of government intervention on economic fluctuations, we retain from the Lucas argument the need to assess volatility of consumption, not output. We will therefore look at both and confirm that they are highly correlated.

Turning to the second assumption, that bigger governments are needed to deliver macroeconomic stability, we note that it rests on two further hypotheses: that there are no available substitutes to government-induced stabilisation; and that the demand for stabilisation remains constant over time, regardless of changes in the structure of the economy.

Both are questionable. The reason why public budgets provide an automatic stabilisation function is that governments face no liquidity constraint and can therefore behave as infinitely durable agents engaged in intertemporal optimisation. It is not their governmental character that matters but the fact that, barring exceptional situations, they enjoy unrestricted access to the capital market and can therefore borrow to smooth out fluctuations in income.

In this role, however, there can be various alternatives to a big government: monetary policy may take up the role devoted to fiscal policy by the traditional literature; financial

cross-country perspective, the first focused on the link between government size and macroeconomic stability. The second approach is longitudinal and has aimed at explaining the steady decline in the volatility of US output.

While we are primarily concerned with the first question, we cannot ignore the second one. Automatic stabilisers are deemed important because economies are subject to shocks and prone to volatility. If volatility vanishes, so does the importance of automatic stabilisers. In what follows, we review the two strands of the literature, starting with the relationship between the size of government and macroeconomic stability.

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it seems to be the first to systematically investigate the relationship between fiscal

aggregates and output volatility for a cross-section of countries. More specifically, the

paper examines the role of income taxes and government purchases as automatic

stabilisers in 22 OECD c

One potential problem with Gali's empirical approach is that it fails to account for a possible simultaneity bias in OLS estimates of the relationship between government size and macroeconomic stability. One reason for that is provided by Rodrik (1998) who argues that precisely because governments tend to stabilise output, one should expect the size of government to be relatively larger in more open economies, which are also more volatile because of their specialisation and their exposure to international shocks. Ignoring such reverse causality may result in a downward bias of the estimated impact of government size on macroeconomic stability.

Several recent studies have explicitly attempted to address the simultaneity issue. In a widely cited study, Fatás and Mihov (2001) replicate Gali's exercise on a cross-section sample of 20 OECD countries over the period 1960-1997, using regressions with instrumental variables to solve the possible simultaneity problem. Government size is measured as the (logarithm of the) average ratio of government spending to GDP for the period, while volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the growth rate of real GDP for the same period. Their main finding is that the negative effect of government size on output volatility becomes larger in absolute value and more precisely estimated when the simultaneity bias is corrected. This result is robust to various measures of output volatility and government size.

Kim and Lee (2007) use a Keynesian framework to estimate the impact of government size (measured by the share of total government expenditure in GDP) on economic uncertainty (measured by intersectoral income fluctuation). Their estimates, based on a cross-section sample of 15 OECD countries over the period 1981-1998 and on estimation

techniques taking into account the simultaneity argument, confirm that a larger government reduces economic uncertainty.

Having validated (and amplified) Gali's (1994) empirical finding, we now turn to its theoretical puzzle, namely the absence of a clear connection—or even, under some reasonable assumptions, a positive correlation—between government size and volatility in the context of a standard RBC model.

The failure of RBC models to predict basic stylised facts of the relationship between fiscal policy and private behaviour has led researchers to incorporate realistic frictions, including market imperfections, nominal rigidities, and non-Ricardian behaviours. For instance, Andrés, Doménech and Fatás (2007) show that adding nominal rigidities and costs of capital adjustment to a standard RBC model can generate a negative correlation between government size and output volatility. However, in their augmented model, the stabilising effect of government is only present because of a 'composition effect'. In fact, increasing the share of government spending in GDP produces two effects in opposite directions. On the one hand, it increases the share of the non-volatile component of GDP; on the other, it increases the volatility of consumption (and investment) in contrast with the empirical findings cited above.

To address this oddity of their model, Andrés, Doménech and Fatás further introduce credit-constrained (or 'rule-of-thumb') consumers, who cannot borrow and lend in financial markets and are therefore constrained to optimise on a period-by-period basis. They find that the modified model is capable of generating a fall in output and consumption volatility when the size of government rises, provided that the rigidities and the proportion of rule-of-thumb consumers are both sufficiently large. This leads them to conclude that models with Keynesian and non-Ricardian features can better replicate the

empirical evidence about the effects of fiscal policy on the volatility of output fluctuations than pure RBC models.

3.1.2. ...but the relationship is likely to be a complex one

The basic relationship between government size and output volatility has been extended in several directions.

Several researchers have examined the role of the composition of taxes and government expenditure. An important step in this direction is the paper by Buti et al. (2003), which argues that automatic stabilisers operate not only on the demand side through their (positive) impact on disposable income, but also on the supply side through the (negative) impact of taxes on production. Distortionary taxes tend to increase the level of equilibrium unemployment and lower potential output. What is more important, however, in the present context is that distortionary taxes also affect the economy's supply response to economic shocks: the more progressive the tax system, the less responsive the supply response because workers demand higher wages to compensate for higher taxes and to maintain their net wages.

Incorporating the supply-side channel of automatic stabilisers in the standard AD/AS model leads to interesting results. Although automatic stabilisers continue to stabilise output in the event of demand shocks, it turns out that they may in fact be destabilising in the event of supply shocks. Whet

the larger the demand impact of automatic stabilisers relative to the supply impact, and therefore the higher the tax threshold.

stabilisation provided by each tax and spending it

tax revenue and 18 cents less expenditure. Household direct taxes (which constitute 28 percent of total government revenue) alone produce nearly half the total stabilisation effect. The authors also present results for the sub-sample of EU15 countries, which broadly agree with those for the full OECD sample.

Silgoner, Reitschuler and Crespo-Cuaresma (2002), attempt, like Martinez-Mongay and Sekkat (2005), to test for the presence of a nonlinear threshold effect in the relationship between government size and output stabilisation. The authors start by estimating the same (linear) equation as Fatás and Mihov (2001), but with a number of modifications. First, they remove discretionary fiscal measures from government spending, their measure of government size. Second, they introduce additional instrumental variables to deal with possible reverse causation. Third, their sample covers 12 EU countries for the period 1970-1999. Finally, they use five-year averages for the dependent and explanatory variables, instead of averages for the entire period, and do pooled estimation in order to obtain sufficient observations. Their regression results are somewhat surprising. While they obtain OLS estimates for the coefficient of government size that are very similar in size and level of significance to those of Fatás and Mihov (2001), their instrumental variable estimates are very

both the linear and the quadratic variables, thereby confirming the existence of nonlinearities. Their results imply a threshold level for government expenditures of about 38 percent. For government sizes below this threshold there is a significant negative relationship between the government expenditure ratio and GDP growth volatility. Beyond this level, however, the relationship turns positive: an increase in public spending will, ceteris paribus, raise the variability of output growth. Since the median value of the government spending to GDP ratio in the study sample is almost 41 percent, the possibility of destabilising non-discretionary public expenditure in Europe seems real.

3.2. Fiscal stabilisation is not a free lunch

It is generally recognised that large government size may have detrimental effects on economic efficiency and growth. Most of the related arguments developed in the literature focus on the potential disincentive effects of high taxation and the perverse effects of inappropriate stabilisation. There is a longstanding theoretical (e.g. Barro, 1990) and empirical (e.g. de la Fuente, 1997) literature showing that high levels of taxation tend to impair the allocation of resources, mainly by depressing incentives to work, to invest and/or to save.

There is also some literature arguing that large governments may impinge on efficiency and growth through the working of automatic stabilisers. In particular, van den Noorde (2002) sees two potential pitfalls associated with automatic stabilisers. First, there is a risk that automatic stabilisers operate more during slowdowns than booms, which may result in adverse debt dynamics leading eventually to higher taxation and long-term interest rates. Second, large automatic stabilisers may delay necessary adjustment to structural changes if they are associated with public spending and revenue that tend to

24-25). In other words, provided it targets wasteful spending, the reduction in the size of government is likely to raise economic efficiency and growth (see also Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000).

The debate on the need to reduce the size of government for efficiency reasons has been particularly lively in Europe, where large public spending combined with a rapidly ageing population have often led to unsustainable fiscal positions. The fiscal retrenchment was politically facilitated during the 1990s by the willingness of most EU member states to accept and fulfil the Maastricht criteria in order to qualify for EMU membership. After the introduction of the euro, the consolidation of public finances has continued, although generally less vigorously than before as the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has proved to be a softer constraint than the Maastricht entry criteria.

The question raised by Buti et al. (2003) is whether there is a potential conflict between efficiency and stabilisation in EMU. The question is pertinent because efforts to reduce the size of government by EMU members risk jeopardising their automatic stabilisers, precisely when they are most needed to compensate for the loss of national monetary policy.

As already alluded to, Buti et al. find that this trade-off may not always be relevant because there may be a critical level of the tax burden beyond which a reduction in taxation may increase the effectiveness of automatic stabilisers. This leads them to conclude that, under certain circumstances, a reduction in the tax burden may in fact result in a 'double dividend': gains in efficiency and better automatic stabilisers. The empirical studies by Martinez-Mongay and Sekhat (2005) and Silgoner, Reitschuler and

Crespo-Cuaresma (2003) lend some tentative evidence in support of Buti et al.'s

conclusion.

3.3. The Great Moderation: Why has output volatility declined?

A widely reported stylised fact of the early post-war period was the higher volatility of

the US economy in comparison to the European economies—a fact that was often

attributed to lower government spending. Yet starting in the mid-1980s, there was a

significant decline in US output volatility—what has been dubbed the *Great Moderation*

(Bernanke, 2004). Since the late 1990s, the causes of this decline have been discussed in a

series of papers, most of which exclusively address developments in the US. More

recently, similar analyses have been conducted in a cross-country perspective.

3.3.1. A large decline in volatility

Basic facts are not a matter for discussion. It is generally recognised that US output

volatility has declined by about one half in comparison to the 1960s and the 1970s (and

by about two-thirds in comparison to the 1950s); that the break occurred around 1984

(Kim and Nelson, 1999; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000); that popular explanations

such as the increasing share of services in the economy are of little relevance; and that the

main proximate causes of the decline in aggregate volatility have been a lower variance of

consumption and residential investment, as well as a lower covariance between them

(Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Stock and Watson, 2003; IMF, 2007). Figure 1, which

updates and complements a figure from Blanchard and Simon, illustrates the magnitude

of the decline in the historical volatility of US GDP. It shows that consumption volatility

followed a roughly similar evolution (the correlation between the rolling standard

deviation of output growth and that of consumption growth is 0.8) and that volatility remains at a historically low level in the 2000s.

There is also consensus on the framework best suited to analyzing the reasons for the decline. Stock and Watson (2003), Bernanke (2004) and IMF (2007) all rely on a "Taylor curve" that corresponds to monetary policy's efficiency frontier. The downward-sloping curve represents the combinations of output and inflation volatility attainable for a given distribution of shocks and a given structure of the economy. The distance between an observation, say point A, and the efficiency frontier characterises the quality of macroeconomic stabilisation. There can also be different combinations such as B and C of output and inflation volatility along the efficiency frontier, which therefore depicts a trade-off.

3.3.2. Possible explanations

Where there is disagreement is on the causes of the decline in output volatility. Three main categories of explanations have been put forward:

a)

3.3.3. Why there is disagreement

There are two reasons why consensus not been reached on what is after all an essentially empirical matter. First, policy improvements are hard to isolate from structural and random factors. Figure 2 helps to understand why. Let us leave for the moment the discussion on whether the frontier shift is temporary or permanent and assume that the observed combination of output and inflation volatility has moved from A to D. Then policy and structures (or luck) must both be part of the explanation. But decomposing between the two requires determining which combination of inflation and output volatility would have been optimal, had the TT frontier not shifted. Assuming the move has been from A to B and D would lead to ascribing the bulk of the reduction in output volatility to structures (or luck). Assuming it has been from A to C and D would result in ascribing the main role to policy improvements instead. So deciding on what has mattered implies making a judgment on policy optimality, thereby on preferences.

James Stock and Mark Watson's assessment that luck was the main factor behind the reduction in output volatility is not based on a denial of the improvements in monetary policy. On the contrary, they estimate that starting in the mid-1980s the reactions of monetary policy to shocks to output and inflation became more stabilising (essentially thanks to a rise in the coefficient of inflation in the Taylor rule in comparison with the policy behaviour of the 1970s). But they conclude from counterfactual simulations with the policy rules of the 1970s that this change did not play a major role in the observed reduction of aggregate volatility. In other words, they view that reduction as resulting from a move along A-B-D. However the IMF (2007) reaches a different conclusion on the basis of a similar, yet more satisfactory, method. Instead of using just one

counterfactual policy rule, they construct the efficiency frontier by simulating the outcome of an optimal policy rule for different relative weights of inflation and output volatility. Their conclusion is that improvements in monetary policy account for one-third of the total reduction in output volatility.

The second reason why the empirical analysis does not yield unambiguous results is that structural and random factors are hard to disentangle from each other. Discussion on this issue often tends to rely on an unsystematic reading of the empirical evidence. Exceptions are IMF (2007), which assesses changes in the distribution of shocks, and Cecchetti,

management). To the extent that those factors have played a role in the reduction of aggregate macroeconomic volatility, they reduce the benefits of automatic stabilisation through bigger governments.

4. Government Size, Fiscal Stabilisation and Volatility

As our selective review of the literature suggests, the relationship between the magnitude of automatic stabilisers (government size) and macroeconomic volatility remains vexingly elusive. On the one hand, theoretical models rely on ad-hoc features to replicate the stylised fact that large governments produce more macroeconomic stability than their leaner counterparts. On the other hand, existing empirical analyses indicate that the relationship between government size and macroeconomic volatility is strong but likely to be complex (non-linear), and that it may have changed over time as time-series evidence appears at odds with cross-sectional regularities.

This section sets the stage for a more formal empirical analysis by providing descriptive evidence on the size of government, macroeconomic volatility, and on the role of fiscal

Looking into possible determinants of these empirical regularities, Rodrik's (1998) argument that more open economies may find it desirable to have bigger governments seems highly relevant. Cross-sectional evidence shows that the positive relationship between government size and trade openness holds for our sample (Figure 5, top panel). Over time, however, the link weakens considerably after the mid-1990s (compare top right and bottom left panels in Figure 5) as changes in trade openness are negatively related to changes in government size (Figure 5, bottom right panel). Although the latter result is evidently driven by two outliers (Belgium, denoted by a dot, and Ireland, denoted by a triangle), the contrast between time-series and cross-sectional evidence remains striking.

The negative time-series correlation between government size and trade openness (or even the absence thereof) thus suggests that Rodrik's point should be qualified by accounting for the existence of potential "collateral benefits" to trade openness in terms of stabilisation. Specifically, if stronger trade linkages are accompanied by heightened financial integration and a smoother functioning of global and domestic financial intermediation, both the need for fiscal stabilisation and the costs of producing it could have changed. On the one hand, an open capital account expands opportunities for smoothing economy-wide consumption and increases pressures for adopting market-friendly reforms, especially in the financial sector (Kose et al., 2006). Greater financial openness coupled with a strengthening of domestic financial market institutions ma.0008naniTc4 Tc-0.2f

4.2.2. Where has volatility declined?

To find out which characteristic matters, we now consider a matrix that splits countries

into four categories combining openness and government size criteria (cut-off levels for

each criterion are the median) and we also consider two sub-periods, 1961-1997 (the

Fatas-Mihov sample) and 1995-2006.

The top and medium panels of Figure 8 indicate that for the whole period as well as in the

first sub-period, volatility is greater in countries with smaller governments and that more

open economies tend to be more volatile than closed economies despite having larger

governments. This reproduces the standard stylised facts pointed out in the literature.

The bottom panel displays the evidence for the last decade 1995-2006. It appears that

volatility has decreased much more in relatively closed countries with smaller

governments than anywhere else, and that more open economies remain more volatile,

especially if their governments are small. So the relationship between volatility and

government size only holds for open economies while that between openness and

volatility holds across the board.

This leads us to test the implications for a bivariate expression of the Fatas-Mihov-Gali

The factor behind this breakdown is that the reduction in volatility has been on average weaker in countries with larger governments. This is evidenced in Figure 10, which plots the relationship between government size and the decline in volatility.

The reasons why countries with larger governments have failed to fully benefit from the Great Moderation are unclear and call for a more detailed analysis with a view to identifying which factors do not apply to the countries with big governments (through interaction terms, see Section 5). Is it that the benefits of financial deepening have been higher in small-government countries, because markets have substituted what was previously a (lack of) government-induced stabilisation? Is it because shocks have been small over the last decade, which has made automatic stabilisers temporarily less relevant? Or could it be that countries with larger governments (many of them in the euro area) have simply not experienced improved monetary policy management, for instance because of inappropriate exchange rate regimes? Finally, it may be the case that governments contribute little to stabilisation after all because the operation of automatic stabilisers has been offset by discretionary actions.

4.3. What Stabilises Private Consumption?

As discussed above, consumers able to optimally adjust their savings could maintain a stable consumption profile regardless of transitory income fluctuations. In the extreme case of perfect and complete markets, income disturbances would be irrelevant for welfare as individuals would have unrestricted access to credit and could trade a wide array of contingent claims. It is therefore important to find out what lies behind the volatility of aggregate private consumption, and whether this has changed over time, while volatility in income was steadily declining. Particular attention is paid to the behaviour of fiscal variables (income taxes and transfers) and savings. In doing so, we use the period budget identity of a representative consumer (i) to decompose the variance of real household consumption (C_i) into its key components, namely personal primary income (Y_i), direct taxes ($_i$

We compute this decomposition for the US and major European countries, distinguishing between pre- and post-1984 periods.[9] Figure 11 first summarises the results for the US. It shows that the decline in the variance of income accounts for the largest fraction of the reduced variance of consumption. A lower variance of savings and a lower (initially positive) covariance between savings and consumption also contribute to reducing consumption fluctuations, but to a significantly lesser degree. Changes in covariances contribute to increasing volatility because of a significantly lower (negative) correlation between income and transfers. There is no meaningful change in the income-tax correlation. Our analysis of US data thus suggests that (1) consumption volatility has declined in line with income volatility; (2) automatic stabilisers have not contributed to this decline, quite to the contrary: the insurance role of transfers seems to have declined; and (3) financial development has played a role—albeit a minor one.

We do the same exercise for the four largest euro area economies, namely France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. We find that all four experienced a very large decline in the variance of consumption. In Germany, Spain and to a lesser extent France, lower income volatility accounts for the largest fraction of this decline. With the exception of Spain, the decline in the variance of savings is also substantial, and in all four countries there is a reduction in the (initially positive) covariance between savings and income. Household saving behaviour seems to be more consistent with buffering income shocks and correspondingly less prone to precautionary saving in bad times. Finally, changes in taxes and transfers seem to have played no meaningful role in the reduction of consumption volatility.

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[9] The 1984 cut-off date is standard in the US literature on the great moderation. This is why we adopted here, even though it may not be the ideal cut-off for all EU countries.

These observations are consistent with the view that the change in government size is unlikely to have contributed to lower consumption volatility, and that the latter has instead been driven by the overall reduction in output volatility and more countercyclical saving behaviour (to which financial development may have contributed).

5. A Fresh Look at the Link between Government Size and Volatility

As discussed above, there are two main reasons as to why large governments are expected to contribute more to output stability than small ones. The first is that the magnitude of automatic stabilisers depends primarily on the size of the government sector (Galì, 1994, Girouard and André, 2005); the second results from a composition effect of domeo8nur

output volatility. Indeed, interesting correlations may emerge both from time-series and cross-sectional dimensions of the data, calling for a panel data analysis. Our panel includes annual data averaged over 10 years.[10] In our view, that time span strikes a good balance between the need to have sufficient observations and the desirability to minimise purely cyclical effects—such as mechanical increases (decreases) in expenditure to GDP ratios during unexpected downturns (upturns).

5.1. Specification and Econometric Issues

As theory provides limited guidance, if any, on the specification of a growth-volatility model, we focus on a parsimonious set of explanatory variables identified as relevant in the literature. Indeed, our objective is not to uncover a new powerful explanation of recent trends through an exhaustive search process, but to take a hard look at conventional wisdom in the face of these new trends, and suggest policy implications.

Our starting point is the standard analysis of Fatás and Mihov (2001), which we extend in three directions. First, we reduce concerns about the small size of the sample (20 OECD countries[11]) by exploiting the time dimension through panel-data analysis. Second, the panel approach allows us to test for two central hypotheses of the Great Moderation debate, namely improvements in the conduct of monetary policy, and greater financial development. While a more credible anchoring of inflationary expectations is expected to

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[10] In earlier decades, we have in some cases less than 10 yearly observations available. To avoid losing too many degrees of freedom, we included averages for decades in which we had at least 5 consecutive annual data points. We are therefore working with a maximum of 91 data points (out of a possible 100).

[11] The countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.

facilitate countercyclical actions by monetary authorities, expanded access to credit should result in a smoother aggregate consumption path because more individuals can self-insure against adverse income shocks. These two hypotheses are essential in our investigation because financial markets and monetary policy are two primary substitutes for fiscal stabilisation. Specifically, we conjecture that in comparison to an economy with dysfunctional monetary and financial institutions, a financially developed economy with credible monetary authorities would likely (i) have a smaller government, and (ii), for a given size of government, contribute less to fiscal stabilisation.[12] We approach the second issue by introducing interaction variables in the model. Interaction terms will also inform us about possible causes of the apparent breakdown in the relationship between government size and volatility in the 1990s, and in particular whether this is related to greater monetary policy credibility and improved access to financial intermediation during that period. The third difference with Fatás and Mihov (2001) follows from Buti et al. (2003), who suggested that the relationship between government size and volatility could be non-linear. We therefore allow for non-constant "returns" of government size in terms of output stability.

The unrestricted form of the estimated equation is as follows:

$$\sum_{j}^{J} \qquad {}_{it}$$

an error term. Estimates of γ_j's and θ_2 provide direct tests of the interactions and non-linearities discussed above. We also performed so-called "spline" regressions, using the

term   (   )

spending could also be a source of shocks that would only be imperfectly reflected in private consumption. The opposite argument holds: government expenditure (e.g. public investment) could be used to enact discretionary stabilisation packages without immediate effect on private consumption but with an undeniably *stabilising* impact on the overall

governments *because* of their intrinsically greater exposure to external shocks and a

correspondingly greater appetite for fiscal stabilisation (Rodrik, 1998). If sufficiently

large, such reverse causality would create a downward bias in the OLS estimates of

explaining volatility by the size of government and the degree of openness to trade[15]. For the sake of comparison with previous studies, we report both cross-country and panel regressions for different time spans of the sample. First, although trade openness tends to increase volatility, the effect is in general not statistically significant, and quantitatively sensitive to time. Second, the negative relationship between government size and volatility weakens dramatically when the sample includes the post-1990 periods. In fact, when the sample is truncated to include only the 1991-2007 period, the relationship turns positive, although it remains statistically non-significant. Similar results hold when our alternative measure of output volatility is used, and when additional control variables (GDP per capita at PPP and average real growth) are introduced (Appendix Tables A1 and A2). This first exercise suggests that the Galì (1994) and Fatás-Mihov (2001) results may be specific to the small sample used in their study (20 observations and time averages heavily influenced by pre-1990 observations). In subsequent regressions, we focus on results obtained for the full panel (that includes all available data points over 1961-2007).

Although the inclusion of time fixed-effects should prevent any statistical bias related to the omission of determinants of output volatility over time, it is useful to check the extent to which progress in the quality of monetary policy and financial development (FD)—two potential substitutes for fiscal stabilisation—plays a significant role in reducing volatility when the size of government is taken into account (Table 2).[16] Both variables seem to

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[15] Openness to trade is measured as the sum of imports and exports divided by twice the GDP.

[16] As previously indicated, the quality of monetary policy is measured as the exponential deviation of actual inflation from a 2 percent inflation target (see IMF, September 2007 *World Economic Outlook*). This captures the idea that a credible inflation anchor helps monetary policymakers to stabilize the economy. The financial development variable is the total credit by deposit money banks to the private sector in percent of GDP.

individually contribute to lower volatility over and above the contribution of automatic stabilisers[17] (columns 1 and 2). Interestingly, the estimated effect of government size appears to weaken when QMP is present, while it seems unaffected by the introduction of FD. This may point to a greater substitutability between monetary and fiscal stabilisation than between the latter and expanded opportunities for individuals to smooth consumption through financial intermediation. However, when both QMP and FD are simultaneously included, their respective effects are not fully robust to time dummies, especially for FD (columns 3 and 4), which becomes statistically insignificant. This suggests that other related developments (omitted here) may have played a role in the decline of output volatility.

Allowing for the impact of government size to vary over time—one coefficient for the period 1961-90 and another for the period 1991-2007—confirms the apparent break in the stabilising role of government size after 1990 (column 5), while leaving the estimated role of FD and QMP largely unchanged. This indicates that the structural break cannot be (entirely) due to the emergence of substitutes to fiscal stabilisation. Yet the weak role played by FD and QMP when fiscal stabilisation is taken into account contrasts with the conventional Great Moderation literature, where these two variables seem to matter more. The last step in our investigation is therefore to test more directly for the possibility that,

stabilisation with larger gove

Second, financial development and, even more so, the quality of monetary policy make a

greater contribution to the reduction of volatility when the

to estimate precisely,[20] and it was not possible to convincingly pin down a specific size threshold beyond which any further expansion of government expenditure would become harmful for stability. However, as shown in Figure 13 (using the results in column 3 of Table 3), an increase in government size by one percent of GDP is unlikely to yield a reduction in output growth volatility exceeding 0.1 percentage point once the overall size of public expenditure approaches 40 percent of GDP.

One last issue investigated in the size-volatility literature is whether the composition of government revenue and expenditure materially affects the magnitude of automatic stabilisers for a given size. The most straightforward way to answer this question is to re-estimate one of our equations (in this case, the parsimonious specification of Table 1) using a variety of revenue and expenditure categories (or more precisely the logarithms of their ratio to GDP) as the relevant measures of government size. The estimates for θ_1 are displayed in Table 4.

In line with Fatás and Mihov (2001), we do not find consistent and robust evidence of significant composition effects, as all expenditure and revenue categories have the same sign regardless of the time span. It is nevertheless worth noting that government consumption and social security transfers are the only categories retaining a significant stabilising effect when using the entire time span 1961-2007. Also, the contribution of indirect taxes generally seems statistically weaker than that of direct taxes, reflecting the lower elasticity of the former to the business cycle (Girouard and André, 2005). This would suggest that the scope for enhancing automatic fiscal stabilisation through a

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[20] Figure 13 illustrates the extent of the uncertainty arising from errors in the estimated coefficients, using the variance-covariance matrix of coefficients to calculate the impact of a 1 standard-deviation difference. Notice that the correlation of errors is almost equal to 1.

deliberate re-shuffling of the structure of government expenditure or revenue may be rather limited. Moreover, it is unclear whether such reshuffling (e.g. a shift of favour direct taxation) would be advisable in terms of the other objectives of public finances (e.g. efficiency).

6. Conclusions

In the euro area, the loss of monetary policy as an instrument to offset country-specific disturbances naturally places the onus on fiscal policy. While there is little doubt that the anti-inflationary credibility of the ECB leaves ample room for an effective monetary stabilisation of common demand shocks, only national fiscal authorities can provide public insurance against country-specific disturbances. A natural question in regard to our analysis is whether participation in the euro area calls for enhanced automatic stabilisation through bigger government. The evidence discussed in the previous section points to a negative answer for several reasons.

First, government expenditure is already large in the euro area, exceeding 45 percent of GDP on average, a range in which any further increase in size does not appear to yield any meaningful benefit in terms of automatic stabilisation. Second, while automatic stabilisers can be enhanced through changes in the composition of expenditure and revenue (for instance by increasing social security transfers and shifting the tax burden towards direct taxation), it is unclear whether the gains in terms of stabilisation would not be offset by efficiency losses. Finally, the apparent substitution between monetary and fiscal stabilisation, and between the latter and market-based self-insurance/stabilisation, suggests two alternatives to bigger governments. The first is that further financial development could alleviate the need for fiscal stabilisation. The second is that governments may be shifting objectives, opting for more stabilisation-friendly policies when alternatives do not appear to be available. Widespread evidence of pro-cyclicality in discretionary fiscal policies in the euro area suggests that there is room for more fiscal stabilisation without necessarily increasing the overall size of the public sector. In comparison, countries with relatively lean public sectors like Japan and the United States

have a consistent record of enacting discretionary fiscal packages explicitly aimed at stabilising the economy (albeit with variable degrees of success). The challenge is to make sure that such actions are timely—which requires short information, decision and implementation lags—and that they are symmetric over the cycle —i.e. any stimulus should be reversed during the upturn. Reforms of fiscal institutions aimed at enhancing such discretionary stabilisation — instead of focusing exclusively on fiscal discipline — are conceivable, and emerge as a fruitful area for further research.

Finally, the econometric evidence pointing to a degree of substitution between fiscal stabilisation and other contributions to stability (monetary policy and financial development) arguably reflects fairly recent developments that may owe much to the circumstances of the 1990s and the early 2000s and ultimately turn out to be exceptional by historical standards. In particular, it is unclear how much extra stability could arise from further improvements in monetary policy design. Also, the extent to which financial development can play an effective stabilisation role through self-insurance remains debatable in light of the procyclical nature of lending standards. The latter tends to be loose in good times when the expected future value of collateral and income gains reduce credit risk, and tighter in bad times for the opposite reasons. The implication is that the prospect for further stability gains outside improved fiscal policies may well be fairly limited and that it may probably be too early to forsake automatic fiscal stabilisation.

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Figure 1: Historical Volatility of US GDP and Consumption

Historical Volatility
(Five-years Standard Deviation of Growth Rates)

Figure 2: The Taylor Curve and the Inflation – Output Volatility Trade-off

Figure 3: Total Expenditure to GDP ratio (1963-2006)

Figure 5: Openness to Trade and Government Size

1961-2006

y = 0.31x + 0.34
R^2 = 0.26

Government expendi

Trade flows to GDP ratio

Figure 8: Volatility by Country Groupings: Openness and Government Size

Figure 9: The Changing Relationship between Volatility and Government Size

Figure 10: **Government Size and Change in Output Volatility**

60

Figure 12: Variance Decomposition of Household Consumption in Selected euro area Countries, pre- and post-1984

Sources: OECD and authors' calculations.

Figure 13: Government Size and Estimated Im

|					
Openness	0.81	0.77	0.25	0.77	0.95 *
	(1.52)	(1.46)	(0.41)	(1.46)	(1.77)
Government size (all sample)	**-1.06** *	**-1.40** **	**-0.83**	**-1.15** *	**…**
	(-1.92)	**(-2.48)**	**(-1.58)**	**(-1.94)**	
Government size (1961-90)	**…**	**…**	**…**	**…**	**-1.98** ***
					(-3.43)
Government size (1991-2007)	**…**	**…**	**…**	**…**	**0.45**
					(0.60)
Quality of monetary policy 1/	-1.36 ***	…	-1.79 ***	-1.12 *	-0.95 *
	(-2.51)		(-3.13)	(-1.88)	(-1.67)
Financial development 2/	…	-0.40 **	-0.41 ***	-0.27	-0.17
		(-1.94)	(-2.65)	(-1.21)	(-0.83)
Constant	1.91 **	0.37	2.92 ***	1.68 *	0.47
	(2.05)	(0.53)	(4.03)	(1.71)	(0.51)
N. obs.					
Time fixed-effects:					
p-value	0.00	0.00		0.00	
Included					
R-squared					

Note: Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel regressions include time effects. The p-value of the time-effects test is associated with the null hypothesis (F-test) that all period effects are jointly equal to zero.

1/ IMF measure (exponential deviation from a 2 percent inflation target, see September 2007 World Economic Outlook).

Table 4. Output Volatility and Alternative Measures of Government Size (pooled OLS)

Dependent variable: standard deviation of real GDP growth

	1	2	3	4
	1961-90	1961-2000	1961-2007	1991-2007
Total expenditure	**-2.68 *****	**-1.78 *****	**-1.32 ****	0.61
	(4.35)	**(-2.60)**	**(-2.37)**	(0.81)
Government consumption	**-2.03 *****	**-1.34 ****	**-0.98 ****	0.53
	(-4.09)	**(-2.40)**	**(-2.17)**	(0.79)
Government wage consumption	**-1.26 ****	-0.65	-0.42	0.46
	(-2.64)	(-1.34)	(-1.12)	(0.70)
Direct taxes	**-0.62 ****	**-0.49 ****	-0.36	0.48
	(-2.53)	**(-2.07)**	(-1.58)	(1.64)
Indirect taxes	**-0.67 ***	-0.27	-0.22	0.46
	(-1.89)	(-0.80)	(-0.81)	(1.29)
Social security transfers paid	**-0.76 ****	**-0.63 ***	**-0.46 ***	0.26
	(-2.32)	**(-1.80)**	**(-1.67)**	(0.54)

Note: Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. All regressions include time fixed-effects.
The baseline specification is that in Table 1. Other coefficients and statistics are not reported but
are available upon request.

Appendix: Robustness checks

Openness	0.42	1.51	0.17	0.41	0.82	1.63 **	0.62 *
	(0.43)	(1.23)	(0.24)	(0.85)	(1.64)	(2.29)	(1.87)
Government size	**-1.10**	**-1.89** **	**-0.69**	**0.44**	**-1.46** ***	**-2.22** ***	**-1.14** **
	(-1.67)	**(-2.65)**	**(-1.22)**	**(0.86)**	**(-2.66)**	**(2.68)**	**(-2.54)**
Constant	0.67	-0.26	0.95	1.47 ***	-0.02	-1.08	0.40
	(0.82)	(-0.28)	(1.42)	(3.01)	(-0.02)	(-1.39)	(0.70)
N. obs.	20	19	20	20	71	51	
Time fixed-effects (p-value)	…	…	…	…	0.12	0.03	0.00
R-squared	0.17	0.33	0.10	0.11	0.30	0.39	0.39

Note: Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel regressions include time effects. The p-value of the time-effects 45&

Openness	…	0.39 ***	0.39 ***	0.39 ***	0.39 ***	0.36 ***
		(2.97)	(2.84)	(2.86)	(2.90)	(2.65)
Rate of urbanization	0.00 **	0.00 **	0.00	0.00	0.00 *	0.00
	(1.91)	(1.83)	(1.54)	(0.78)	(1.76)	(0.47)

Openness	0.84	0.77	0.38	0.79	0.97 *
	(1.64)	(1.46)	(0.68)	(1.54)	(1.85)
Government size (all sample)	**-1.16 ** **	**-1.40 ** **	**-0.84 ***	**-1.26 ** **	**…**
	(-2.26)	**(-2.48)**	**(-1.74)**	**(-2.35)**	
Government size (1961-90)	**…**	**…**	**…**	**…**	**-2.07 ** ***
					(-3.91)
Government size (1991-2007)	**…**	**…**	**…**	**…**	**0.35**
					(0.48)
Central bank independence	-0.78 **	…	-1.25 ***	-0.67 *	-0.56 *
	(-2.21)		(-3.62)	(-1.79)	(-1.74)
Financial development 1/	…	-0.40 **	-0.41 ***	-0.32	-0.22
		(-1.94)	(-2.88)	(-1.59)	(-1.12)
Constant	0.81	0.37	1.98 ***	0.79	-0.28
	(1.14)	(0.53)	(3.51)	(1.14)	(-0.28)
N. obs.					
Time fixed-effects:					
p-value	0.00	0.00		0.00	
Included					
R-squared					

Note: Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Panel regressions include time effects. The p-value of the time-effects test is associated with the null hypothesis (F-test) that all period effects are jointly equal to zero.

1/ Financial developmed icpme ased asheoal c-ehithhe psi pmoeass e th

Openness	0.74	0.72	0.70	0.90 *	0.75	0.63	0.67	0.74
	(1.45)	(1.37)	(1.25)	(1.78)	(1.50)	(1.38)	(1.25)	(1.54)
Government size (GS)	**-2.74 *****	**-2.79 *****	**3.34**	**…**	**-1.91 *****	**-1.64 ****	**1.54**	**…**
	(-3.26)	**(-3.66)**	**(1.42)**		**(-3.37)**	**(-2.46)**	**(0.65)**	