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1 Introduction

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., a b a a ab U a aU aa. , a HICP) a b U , a - , a aU a , aU a . a ECB b a ab U ab U a a

2. M aU Ua a ab Ua a U . H b a a ab U b b a aU ab U a U, b a a a ab U a a a a b ab Ua a ab U

3. b a a a a a U a aU a ba (a) a . H a b , a a U a aU a a (TLTRO) a a (b a).

2 Challenges for monetary policy in the euro area

2.1 A potential decline of neutral interest rates

N a U a b a a b 1980 (C a U, 2016). A b aU Ub a a b a a a a a a. H a 1980 a 1990 , 2000 a b a a a a a a a ba . a a a U a a 15 U aU, ‘ a a ’, a b a b U a a ab a , aU ab U(a aU a Ua ba ’ aU). a Ua ba ’ a a aU U a a - a a , a a

Figure 1: Estimates of the neutral interest rate for the US and the euro area, in percent



Source: Based on Holston et al (2016).

Table 1: Average movements in policy rates during recessions in Germany, UK, US

Country	Time period	Average policy rate (%, peak)	Average policy rate (%, trough)	Average policy rate change (%)
Germany	1960-2018	5.0	2.4	-2.6
United Kingdom	1955-2018	8.7	5.8	-2.9
United States	1953-2018	8.5	3.8	-4.7

S rce: By e ba ed " De t c e B " de ba" , Ba" f E" a" d, Fyed, NBER, B bey , OECD C ; ite Leadi" I" dicat y .

2.2 A potential attening of the Phillips Curve

T a P a a - b U a , a , a b U a . H F a' a P (F a 1968) a a a a U U a b U b (b U a) a a a(a U a a a U a NAIRU). T a P a a . I - a b U a U a (b b U a NAIRU), a a I a P a a a , a b U a a a a (F 2). T b a a ab U U a a a a a a US a a, a a . T a b a a U a ba a : U a a U a a a a b a U| – (IMF, 2014). S a U b a U a a a a a a a US E (E a U a a a US - U). T a a P a , a a a a , a b a a a 1980 , a a (B a a , 2016). T U a - a a , a a a a a - . F a , K (2018) a a a US a 1 1.5 a a a U U a , U a a . T b a a (a C , - , 2017, Ca U, 2017), a a a a : 1) NAIRU b a a ; 2) a

b , a T a , .

Figure 2: Phillips Curves (x-axis quarterly unemployment in percent, y-axis year-on-year quarterly in ation in percent)



S rce: B y e e ba ed OECD.

2.3 The interaction between price stability and nancial stability

ba (B , 2004; Ra , 2006) D - (2018), a . M , , .

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ba)[1], b a ESCB
[2] a -
[3].
, , a U U U a ab U? a
a a a b - a ba a a U U (S

2.5 A challenging European institutional framework

3 Adapting the ECB's framework to face these challenges

3.1 The current framework

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A a a ba a a a)-U a a a a)-U H -
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4 What is the possible evolution of the ECB's monetary framework?

4.1 Adjusting the de nition of price stability to increase exibility

T a)-U a ECB' a a ab)-Ua a a U b , a a a ab a ab a ab . T ab)-U ECB G C (a a 2003).

T a a b a a ECB P - b a a : 1) a a ; 2) a a : a a a a a (a- a a a)-Ua); 3) a ba a a , 4) - a U , a ; a a)-U5) a a a a , a a ab)-U T a b)-Ua a a a , a a ab)-U , 2 , , , (a)-U a 18 3-U EMC /S a (,)-1 (2)-8.9 ( )12 ( )7 ( )7 (

4.2 What should the ECB do if price stability and financial stability diverge?

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B , C , Ma a Pa , A P a (2010) 'M P Fa ', *P - E P S - J H* , 2010: 267-328

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M S a (2015) ‘S a , a - a a’, *W P* 2015/14, B

N B Gab P Ka K a , (2015) ‘D Ka a U a U a ba ?’ *B E W P* 521, Ba E a

N Ma a , a Da V (2005) ‘A U