number of major respects. Firs the European Commission the Annual Growth Survey (A well before national governme have started preparing dra budgets for the following year. member states are obliged to t the AGS into account wh drafting Stability or Converger Programmes and National Ref Programmes. The new appro to policy coordination also give European Commission increased intervention rights terms of both the areas in wh the Commission may interve and the stringency of intervention (see Box 2). Commission's role strengthened relative to the Council, which in some areas now only oppose a Commiss recommendation to impos sanctions on non-performing member states, rather than be required to approve. it The European Semester also chan EU policy coordination in the fiscal and structural reforms a considered jointly

## BOX 1: THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER TIMELINE

defines a list of policy priorities The European Semester begins with the publication by the European Commission of the Annual Growth Survey (AGS), which is a list of general policy priorities for the EU and its member states

> The EU Council (grouped in different formations) and the European Parliament debate the AGS until March, when the spring European Council formally endorses it.

> Following endorsement by the Spring European Council, EU member states must take EU policy guidance into account when drafting their Stability or Convergence Programmes (SCPs) and National Reform Programmes (NRPs), both of which they must submit to the Commission by 30 April each year

The European Commission evaluates national plans to ensure that proposed measures respect the priorities and objectives identified in the AGS. Around the end of May, the Commission publishes its owne end of the assessment of national fiscal and structural plans and releases European Semester, each country receives

country-specific recommendations and euro-area recommendations.recommenda-

The Council then approves draft recommendations, the Jungo Harro Member State pean Council endorses them, and finally the Council publishes mentation and can country-specific recommendations, which are binding on #U membersanctions for

The six pack allows the European Parliament to make use of the failure to bring the the six pack allows the European Parliament to make use of the failure to bring the nomic Dialogue instrument to engage in a discussion withce Etle GDP or to corinstitutions and national representatives on issues relating to the tract large macro-European Semester - whether concerning the Commission's Accioning the country-specific recommendations or the national implementa-structural intertion of the recommendations - at almost any point in time throughoutet and service the Semester process (see Table 1).

The European Parliament fought rightly – for a stronger role in the ck, see Box 2). These allowresentatives on economic issues, at the same time as European Semester proceduteropean Parliament to hold differeby introducing an element of Stability or Converand secured the right to Economissions with the other Eduarliamentary accountability. Dialogues (introduced with the isistitutions and with national rep-

Table 1: European Semester timeline

	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	June	July	N
European Commission	Adoption: AC						Adoption: CSRs/ EAR			!
EU Council		Debate a	and orienta	tions on A				Finalisatio tion of CS		
European Parliam	1				Europear	n Dialogue				
European Coun	(				Endorse- ment of AG			Endorseme CSRs/EAF		6. tiv
Member states			National I	Parliaments	s discuss S S	Submissior SCPs/NRF				th na

4. National Reform Pro-

ns in labour and

markets.

tions. The Commission

non-compliance. Sanctioning applies only to

gence Programmes. The idea is that the Commission should do a joint review of both the macro and micro economic policies the Member State government is proposing.

5. Formally, the AGS is based on the EU2020 rategy progress report, the Macroeconomic Report and the Joint Employment Report.

. The two pack legislaive proposal suggests that the submission of national documents is

KeyAGS = Annual Growth Survey; CSRs = country-specific recommendations; EARs = euro-area recommendations of experimental forms of the case of euro-area recommendations. ity and Convergence Programmes; NRPs = National Reform Programmes. Source: Bruegel. countries.



## O pruegelpolicybrief

9. The German case demonstrates that Member State governments generally 'implement' recommendations they were already doing anyway and ignore recommendations that would involve truly new reforms.

10. Van Rompuy, Herman (2012) and Future of Europe Group (2012).

11. A good press review is 'The eurozone: an ever-deeper democratic deficit',The Economist 26 May 2012.

12. At the same time, there is at least some hope that this may be evolving-in a recent special issue Efectoral Studieswhich analysed a set of data from the 2009 European Parliamentary elections, there is some evidence that in Member States where there was a lot of coverage of European issues there was also voting more along European instead of national lines. SeElectoral StudiesMarch 2011, vol 30 (1), edited by Sara Hobolt and Mark Franklin.



or in reaction to the final countayed Convergence Programmtest to citizens' welfare. specific recommendations. It st where the programmes are cannot change recommendaiscussed, it is mostly because therefore conclude that, so far, tions. Yet, while such involvement parliament is already involved tional parliaments have not does not come with any decision the discussion of governmentfficiently making rights, it still representsulti-annual fiscal plans othebated, let alone provided legitian instrument to exercise mottatin its Stability or Convergencecy for, the EU Council suasion and to hold EU instit Programme. Italy and Portugal recommendations.

tions to account. exceptions to this:

3.2The role of national parliaments

parliaments discuss only the THREE WAYS TOWARDS MORE 'European' and not 'domestic FECTIVENESS AND documents. LEGITIMACY

The budget is the most import and cond, parliamentary committee see three options for strengthpart of the parliamentary deties are much more involved theming the democratic legitimacy, sion-making power in eacthenaries in the discussion and in turn the effectiveness, of country. Structural reforms Eruropean documents. In the new EU economic governance terms of labour market laws, promabjority of countries both the mework(a) enhance the role policies anbudget and EU affairs committees the European institutions at market competition policies are also certiscuss either Stability and Connember state level while increastral elements of parliamentamergence Programmes (engone the role of the European decision-making processes. Moreland) or National Reform Prarliament in holding EU instituintrusive EU intervention integrammes (eg Cyprus, UK) or brieths to account enhance the national decision-making præg Estonia, Germany, Hungarolle of national parliaments at the cesses therefore raises thealy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxe EnU level, an(d) create a legitiquestion of how policy outcombourg, Portugal, Slovenina ate political union, which would are legitimised. While the Eußoveden). require the role and decisionpean Semester assigns a weak making powers of the European role to the European Parliamentified, a significant number of Eduliament to be enhanced in a the Semester's legitimacy would untries have not discussed unificant fashion. All three not be an issue if there was @iouncil recommendationsptions have in common that they dence that national parliamentsceived at the end of the Euattempt to improve the process of are truly involved in the processean Semester cycle, even diffining the common European To investigate this issue, in a procember states are indeed askieterest, which should render the vious project for the Europetan include those recommended more effective and legitimate. Parliament, we submitted tigons in the measures listed in the first two options could – at survey to the EU27 national parational budget law for the compast to some extent – be done in liaments to determine the externective year, and in laws thre framework of the current to which they discuss Stability boroader macroeconomic issues aties. The third option would Programme shere the EU recommendations require treaty changes. Convergence National Reform Programmes bande been discussed, the debate the EU's recommendations. Tobacerned both fiscal recommend Brussels goes to capitals results presented in Hallerbergdations under Stability and al (2012) may be summarised @srowth Pact provisions, and nloop ut legitimacy would increase if follows. binding structural refornthe European Commission would

recommendations, and wehave more regular contacts with First, only the parliaments of ostly dealt with by Europeanational parliaments. The October 13. We received repliesFrance. Luxembouraffairs committees as if they welle12 visit of European Central Italy, to our survey from all Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and reference a matter of the relations beank president Mario Draghi to Bulgaria. United Kingdom discuss Stabilitith the EU, rather than being the-German Bundestag sets an

example that Commissioners should follow One can argue, of course, that contact with the European Parliament is enough: contacts with national parliawould be unduly ments burdensome in terms of time and expense. Yet the EU is by no means a self-contained mature polity, and the European Parliament is not the sole, or even the main, source of input legitirhacy More outreach to national legislatures by Brussels would relieve national governments from being the main communication channel between the EU and national parliaments. While Hallerbeetrgal (2012) showed that many national parliaments are active and debate the national documents submitted to the EU, far fewer parliaments debate the recommendations issued by the Council. Yet, that is the stage at which concrete policy measures should be formulated and implemented by national parliaments. A stronger presence by the responsible Commissioner, for example in the form of a hearing at a number of national parliaments each year, would be a strong step towards making EU coordination more effective.

Brussels would go to capitals if the inter-parliamentary cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments is exploited to its full potential. The existing Interparliamentary Committee meetings