

THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY RELATIONSHIP: A FRESH PERSPECTIVE

Simone Tagliapietra Research Fellow, Bruegel

A NEW PARADIGM FOR EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ENERGY COOPERATION



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POLICY CHALLENGE

Under the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, southern Mediterranean countries

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countries meet their energy needs in a sustainable way would also bene t Europe by opening up new business opportunities for European energy companies, promoting the export of European renewable energy technologies, guaranteeing the stability of future gas exports from the region to Europe, promoting economic development in southern Mediterranean countries and delivering on those countries' pledges under the Paris Agreement.

1 ENERGY: THE CORE OF THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP

Energy is a fundamental component of the economic relationship between the European Union and the 'southern neighbourhood' Mediterranean counis dates back to the 1960s, when discussions started on the rst large-scale energy infrastructure in the Mediterranean region - a gas pipeline connecting Algeria to Italy via Tunisia. Since then, more than 6,000 kilometres of gas pipelines have been laid across the Mediterranean, to connect Algeria with Spain and Italy, and Libya with Italy. Large-scale liqui ed natural gas (LNG) and oil infrastructure has also been constructed all around the Mediterranean².

is infrastructure, built on the basis of bilateral state-to-state and company-to-company relationships between producers in the south and importers in the north, still channels a major part of Southern Mediterranean countries' (SMCs) total exports to Europe (Figure 1).



Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat data.


In the early 2000s, the idea emerged of replicating the successful gas cooperation story in the Mediterranean region in the area of renewable energy. Taking a regionalist approach rather than a traditional bilateral approach to cooperation, two initiatives were launched with the objective of tapping into the vast solar and wind energy potential of SMCs: Desertec and the Mediterranean Solar Plan. ese would supply clean energy to the SMCs and to Europe. Desertec was

a German industrial initiative, and the Mediterranean Solar Plan was a Union for the Mediterranean agship project. Both initiatives were supported by the European Union, which has always viewed energy cooperation as a special tool to promote political stability and economic prosperity in the region.

But these two initiatives failed in less than a decade, largely because of a lack of commercial and political realism. initiatives' business models were based on the export to the EU of solar and wind electricity produced in SMCs and were not commercially viable because of: i) high electricity generation costs; ii) lack of electricity interconnections between SMCs and between the northern and southern Mediterranean shores: and iii) the lack of a clear need on the EU side for additional renewable energy capacity. In political terms, the initiatives did not properly consider that the rst priority for SMCs was meeting their own booming energy demand. Nor did they take su ciently into account the overall lack of cooperation between SMCs, the group of countries with the lowest level of intra-regional trade in the world. In particular, both initiatives proved unrealistic because they sought to adopt a one-size- ts-all approach to a region that was – and continues to be – too complex and diverse for this to work (Tagliapietra and Zachmann, 2016).

is experience suggests that fostering renewable energy in the region cannot be done on the basis of a Eurocentric approach. In other words, instead of the traditional focus on exporting energy from SMCs to Europe, the priority should be supporting SMCs in meeting their booming energy demand in a sustainable way. Cooperation between the EU and SMCs in terms of renewable energy should be about developing projects for the SMCs' consumption, not for Europe's. Since 2000, energy demand, especially electricity demand, has boomed in SMCs is trend is set to continue in the future, in response to expected population and GDP growth in SMCs.

From an energy cooperation perspective, the most sensible way for the EU to respond to this challenge is to foster 748 7480742774




International private investment is essential to meet this large investment need. However, various barriers in SMCs continue to prevent international investors from becoming more engaged in SMC renewable energy sectors (RES4MED, 2017). Two key barriers stand out:

- Legal and regulatory barriers: All SMCs have renewable energy targets, but achieving them ultimately relies on the presence of sound and stable renewable energy regulatory frameworks. On this front, much remains to be done in the SMCs. Jordan is the only SMC with a well-established and reliable renewable energy regulatory framework, while in other countries the situation is more complex. For instance, frequent changes in feedin-tari schemes and fossil-fuel
- subsidies are a concern for investors in Egypt, while the lack of an independent regulatory authority is a key concern for investors in Morocco.
- e lack of a fully developed regulatory framework continues to hinder investments in Algeria, Lebanon and Tunisia.
- Financial barriers: Currency convertibility, in ation and lack of foreign reserves are concerns for investors in almost all SMCs. e cost of nancing and the limited availability of debt from commercial sources for renewable projects represent a general challenge in all SMCs, though to dierent degrees. ese barriers are felt either through non-availability of nance or in exible grace periods that are not adapted to the characteristics of such investments.


Over the last decade, wind and solar power have become mainstream technologies thanks to substantial declines in their costs. Since 2009, solar photovoltaic costs have dropped by 80 percent and this trend is continuing. Wind turbine costs have halved in the same period. In 2017, the cost of electricity generation from newly installed wind averaged \$0.06 per kilowatt-hour (kWh) worldwide.

e cost structure of electricity generation from renewable energy technologies di ers from thermal power generation since renewables do not use any fuels. Most of the generation cost relates to the capital cost of technologies. Financing costs, therefore, are key to ensuring cost-competitiveness. Capital costs include the costs of debt and equity, and are a ected by country- and industry-speci c risks. For instance, the cost of capital for renewable energy investments in Europe ranges from 3.5 percent in Germany to 12 percent in Greece for onshore wind (DiaCore, 2016). is wide range is a consequence of the di erent policy risks that investors face (for example, di erences in the national regulatory frameworks that support the deployment of renewable energy sources).

An enabling investment environment boosted by low nancing costs is fundamental to create markets for renewable energy technologies. is is where climate nance comes into play. In SMCs, renewable energy is nanced from various sources. One form is funding made available by private investors, along with land ownership. is comes with minor risks as funds are readily available. Commonly, local banks and international nance institutions (IFIs) provide loans to investors in renewable energy. For these loans, the interest rate, which would determine to a great extent the cost of capital, could depend on factors including loan type, the currency of the loan and funding source. For instance, an issue for SMCs in particular is that interest rates for local currency are much higher than 10 percent currently. On the other hand, foreign exchange loans in euros or US dollars from IFIs such as the EBRD and the EIB could of er investors more favourable nancing costs. Greater engagement of these institutions and other climate nance vehicles could leverage additional nancing, in particular from the private sector, because the IFIs' risk-mitigation and credit-enhancement tools would reduce the risks for private investors.



SMCs must take action to overcome these barriers, in line with their respective national circumstances. at is, the governments of SMCs should act rst and reform their energy sectors in order to



Source: Bruegel based on Comtrade.

In order to have an impact, energy cooperation between the EU and SMCs should shift its focus from the export of energy from SMCs to Europe, to Europe supporting SMCs in meeting their booming energy demand in a sustainable way.

Europe could scale-up its climate nancing activity in SMCs to support these countries in meeting their Paris Agreement pledges. But greater support should be linked to the implementation of energy reforms in SMCs, aimed at removing the barriers to the private sector's engagement in their renewable energy sectors. is could be done by promoting pragmatic solutions to specic clegal, regulatory and nancial bottlenecks in individual SMCs. Higher levels of climate nance should be o ered only to SMCs that actually implement such solutions. Supporting SMCs in meeting their energy needs in a sustainable way would also bene t Europe both in economic and political terms.