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The Global Gateway Initiative is the European Union's response to the shifting dynamics of global infrastructure investment, and particularly China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While the latter has existed for 11 years, the Global Gateway was launched in 2021 with the goal of mobilising investment of up to €300 billion by 2027, primarily for digital connectivity, energy and transport, with a focus on sustainability. The EU’s objectives are commendable and the funds reasonably large, yet much smaller than those deployed under the BRI. The Global Gateway also faces significant challenges that could undermine its effectiveness.

The idea of the Global Gateway can be traced back to a growing recognition within the EU that it had become a ‘payer but not a player’ on the global stage. This coincided with China's expanding influence in developing regions, where it has established dependencies through substantial investment, control of critical raw materials and a dominance in a number of key export goods.

The EU's previous strategies, particularly in Asia, were criticised for being too limited and lacking adequate funding mechanisms. The Global Gateway was conceived as a more comprehensive approach that would enhance European influence while addressing the needs of developing nations. Despite its ambitious goals, the initiative has been met with confusion over its objectives and implementation strategies. The existence of about 225 Global Gateway flagship projects – many of which lack clear prioritisation – illustrates a fundamental problem: without a coherent strategy, it is difficult to assess progress or impact.

China’s BRI also suffers from drawbacks: from overreach to waste (as projects are not always profitable or useful). However, a general strategy exists, with the focus on increasing China’s linkages with the rest of the world through both soft and hard economic power. The EU's approach to development assistance, in turn, is characterised by untied aid principles, which makes any project less appealing for European businesses.

Understanding how the Global Gateway compares to China's BRI is critical in order to improve the design of the Global Gateway and extend its scope. The BRI started with the objective of helping address China's overcapacity problem by increasing the number of markets to which China could export goods. China needed to develop new trade routes and did so through a hub-and-spoke model. The Global Gateway offers an alternative model based on shared values and sustainable development at the core of the infrastructure building.

While such objectives should, in principle, make the Global Gateway more appealing to emerging economies, the reality is that it has not been received with as much interest as the BRI. There are three main reasons for this.

First, BRI projects more quickly and more easily. Red tape for BRI projects is less cumbersome since they are managed centrally, carried out by China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and usually financed by China’s state-owned banks. Compared to the high level of coordination between SOEs, Chinese state-owned banks and the Chinese government, the EU with its decentralised private sector participation and untied aid principles has a hard time in competing.

Second, corruption-related scrutiny is much higher at EU level, thus reducing the appeal of the projects for some governments. Third, China is by now the largest trading partner of many of the countries where the BRI has been implemented, making a stronger case for logistical connectivity with China.

In conclusion, many of the challenges faced by the Global Gateway will be hard to tackle since they pertain more to China’s unique economic system of state (if not party)-capitalism. However, issues intrinsic to the Global Gateway itself could be addressed. In particular,  the EU should prioritise clarity in the Global Gateway’s strategic objectives, and should enhance cooperation between public institutions and private enterprises, with the aim of seizing the opportunities that Europe’s private sector might grasp from investing in emerging and developing countries. By doing so, the EU could position itself as a credible alternative to China's BRI, while fostering genuine partnerships with developing nations. Ultimately, success will depend on whether the Global Gateway can move beyond mere rhetoric to deliver tangible benefits that resonate with local populations.

If the Global Gateway is executed effectively, and notwithstanding its natural shortcomings compared to a centrally-led project like the BRI, it still has the potential to improve Europe's geopolitical standing and to contribute meaningfully to global development goals.

ZhōngHuá Mundus is a newsletter by Bruegel, bringing you monthly analysis of China in the world, as seen from Europe.

This is an output of China Horizons, Bruegel's contribution in the project Dealing with a resurgent China (DWARC). This project has received funding from the European Union’s HORIZON Research and Innovation Actions under grant agreement No. 101061700.