First glance

Less complacency, more investment: a European defence procurement strategy would be cheaper

It is time for decision-makers to consider bold steps to strengthen European defence

Publishing date
03 October 2024
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Two and a half years into Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, the question of armaments and the speed of military procurement and production is gaining in importance – and Europe will have to get more involved. Europe, especially Germany, has neglected its security for decades and the situation is improving only very slowly. For example, it will take many decades for Germany to build back up to the number of artillery systems it had just 20 years ago. Meanwhile, Russian military production has increased massively, to the point where it can produce the equivalent of the entire German stock of major weapon systems in less than a year.

Despite the alarming numbers, many, including in the security community, believe that Europe can ultimately rely on the United States for defence. The argument is thaty, since many military services, such as securing air superiority, are ultimately provided by the US.

There is also extreme scepticism about a European approach to defence procurement. Why think about Europe as long as countries have domestic defence industries and for additional needs can buy American products? These assumptions are not surprising: Europe’s dependence on the US has been advantageous and has served European interests well. Furthermore, EU defence procurement initiatives have not been very successful.

However, it is time to overcome the excessive dependence on the US for both the provision of security and the supply of major weapons systems. The European political system must leave its comfort zone for three reasons.

First, regardless of the November presidential election result, the US will have to focus more on other world regions. Second, policymakers must face the fact that the US is not only deeply divided, but is also showing signs of political fragility and may be facing a severe constitutional crisis. Third, the US production capacity for military goods is limited as it delivers weapons systems to allies in Asia, the Middle East and Ukraine. Systems such as the HIMARS rocket launcher will be in high demand, for example in connection with Taiwan.

At this critical moment, governments of key European countries should thus develop and promote a European defence strategy. With growing defence budgets, it should be easier to move beyond national interests in the defence sector. Previous European defence procurement initiatives were hampered by excessive national protectionism. Countries justified this citing national security interests but it was often local jobs that drove it. However, rising defence budgets now mean that more jobs are being created in the defence sector and the situation of European defence companies has also improved considerably since 2022. There is therefore scope for action against protectionism motivated by local industrial policy interests.

A European armaments production strategy should aim for higher production volumes at lower unit costs. With tight public budgets, high production costs are difficult to justify. Greater efficiency is only possible through greater industrialisation of production and greater specialisation of production across Europe.

The European strategy must therefore find ways to allow market forces and companies to decide on the best ways to produce cost-effectively. Instead of each country buying small quantities at high cost from local manufacturers, Europe must find ways to exploit economies of scale by integrating its markets. Security concerns must be taken into account, but this should be underpinned by clear justifications.

A European debt fund would ensure a rapid increase in demand. It could be used to strengthen the German air defence European Sky Shield Initiative, which would lead to more joint procurement and economies of scale. It would strengthen joint procurement, accelerate the development of defence capabilities and support market integration. It is time for decision-makers to consider bold steps to strengthen European defence. A stronger Europe is essential for the transatlantic alliance. The complacent view that business as usual will continue can no longer be justified.

This First Glance was also published by in Italian and by in German.

About the authors

  • Guntram B. Wolff

    Guntram Wolff is a Senior fellow at Bruegel. He is also a Professor of Economics at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). 

    From 2022-2024, he was the Director and CEO of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and from 2013-22 the director of Bruegel. Over his career, he has contributed to research on European political economy, climate policy, geoeconomics, macroeconomics and foreign affairs. His work was published in academic journals such as Nature, Science, Research Policy, Energy Policy, Climate Policy, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Banking and Finance. His co-authored book “The macroeconomics of decarbonization” is published in Cambridge University Press.

    An experienced public adviser, he has been testifying twice a year since 2013 to the informal European finance ministers’ and central bank governors’ ECOFIN Council meeting on a large variety of topics. He also regularly testifies to the European Parliament, the Bundestag and speaks to corporate boards. In 2020,  ranked him one of the 28 most influential “power players” in Europe. From 2012-16, he was a member of the French prime minister’s Conseil d’Analyse Economique. In 2018, then IMF managing director Christine Lagarde appointed him to the external advisory group on surveillance to review the Fund’s priorities. In 2021, he was appointed member and co-director to the G20 High level independent panel on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response under the co-chairs Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Lawrence H. Summers and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. From 2013-22, he was an advisor to the Mastercard Centre for Inclusive Growth. He is a member of the Bulgarian Council of Economic Analysis, the European Council on Foreign Affairs and advisory board of Elcano. He is also a fellow at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

    Guntram joined Bruegel from the European Commission, where he worked on the macroeconomics of the euro area and the reform of euro area governance. Prior to joining the Commission, he worked in the research department at the Bundesbank, which he joined after completing his PhD in economics at the University of Bonn. He also worked as an external adviser to the International Monetary Fund. He is fluent in German, English, and French. His work is regularly published and cited in leading media. 

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