First Glance

The European Union should form an international open trade coalition in response to Trump’s tariffs

A formal commitment to open rules-based trade by the EU and likeminded countries is essential to respond to today’s dangerous new trade reality

Publishing date
15 April 2025
Authors
André Sapir
André 150425

Bruegel takes no institutional standpoint. All views expressed are the researchers’ own.

On what he branded “Liberation day” (2 April 2025), President Trump made good on his threat to increase United States tariffs by 60% on imports from China and by between 10% and 20% on imports from other trading partners, including the European Union. He announced a two-tier additional tariff structure: 10% on all imports from all countries, except Canada and Mexico; and a country-specific ‘reciprocal tariff’ on most imports from countries that have large and persistent goods trade surpluses with the US. 

The uniform 10% baseline tariff went into effect on 5 April 2025. The higher country-specific reciprocal tariffs were supposed to begin on 9 April 2025. However, following turmoil in financial markets, President Trump announced on 8 April that reciprocal tariffs would be suspended for 90 days. China was excluded from the suspension measure on the grounds that it had already retaliated against its country-specific US tariff.  

According to the Trump Administration and its supporters, the 90-day pause is supposed to allow on how they plan to reduce their bilateral trade surpluses with the US. 

The question now is how the EU should react to the new reality its exporters face in the US market – a 10% tariff on most products and a 25% tariff on steel, aluminium and cars – and to the further threat that, after the 90-day pause, the 10% uniform tariff may become an EU-specific tariff of 20%.

While the EU debates the pros and cons of making a deal with the US in the next 90 days (surely a bad idea since it would mean capitulating to blackmail) and of retaliating against the new US tariffs that are already in place and/or the additional ones that may come in three months (an idea that deserves serious debate), it should make intense efforts to reinforce its cooperation with other countries.  

Beyond seeking to expand its network of bilateral and regional trade and cooperation agreements with countries in the Americas, Asia, Africa and, obviously, Europe, the EU should launch a multilateral initiative with as many likeminded countries from the Global North and the Global South as possible. 

EU leaders should engage with leaders of G20 and non-G20 countries to agree on a statement in London in April 2009 at the height of the global financial crisis. This statement should be drafted along the following lines:

We, the leaders of [X], reaffirm our commitment to open and rules-based trade embodied by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). World trade growth has underpinned rising global prosperity for nearly 80 years. To this effect, we recall the essential contribution by the United States to the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947, and its successor, the WTO, in 1995.

Today, the United States is rejecting the basic tenets of the world trading system by adopting unilateral protectionist measures that will harm not only our nations but the entire world, including the United States. We deeply regret this situation. 

We will not follow the protectionist path chosen by the United States. Instead, we will refrain from raising new barriers to trade and investment and respect WTO rules in our mutual relations.

Beyond this standstill commitment, we will instruct our trade ministers to launch negotiations to reform the rules of the WTO in three key areas: dispute settlement; subsidies; and climate, trade and development. They should find ways to make progress in all three areas, even if some WTO members who are not signatories to this statement refuse to cooperate.

Admittedly, the G20 has become a difficult forum in which to find agreement on such a statement because of the presence of the United States and Russia, two members that have recently flouted international norms and rules. Nonetheless it may serve as a basis for an agreement among its other 18 members (call it the G18) and all other nations that remain attached to an open, rules-based, multilateral trading order.                 

About the authors

  • André Sapir

    André Sapir, a Belgian citizen, is a Senior fellow at Bruegel. He is also University Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB) and Research fellow of the London-based Centre for Economic Policy Research.

    Between 1990 and 2004, he worked for the European Commission, first as Economic Advisor to the Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, and then as Principal Economic Advisor to President Prodi, also heading his Economic Advisory Group. In 2004, he published 'An Agenda for a Growing Europe', a report to the president of the Commission by a group of independent experts that is known as the Sapir report. After leaving the Commission, he first served as External Member of President Barroso’s Economic Advisory Group and then as Member of the General Board (and Chair of the Advisory Scientific Committee) of the European Systemic Risk Board based at the European Central Bank in Frankfurt.

    André has written extensively on European integration, international trade and globalisation. He holds a PhD in economics from the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, where he worked under the supervision of Béla Balassa. He was elected Member of the Academia Europaea and of the Royal Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts.

Related content