Blog post

A German fiscal union?

Publishing date
05 December 2011

The euro area has come to a critical point. Failure to act will lead to disintegration with non-calculable costs for all member state economies, massive increases in unemployment and a large drop in well-fare. Why has no viable solution been found so far in face of such massive cost? The main reason is a classic coordination problem. In the absence of trust or a strong supra-national institution, individual countries will negotiate based on narrowly defined national interest, despite the fact that the final result will be worse for everybody.

From a technical point of view, three things need to be addressed. First, a lender of last resort needs to be created in order to stop self-fulfilling sovereign crises. Interest rates paid on sovereign bonds in a number of countries are clearly the result of self-fulfilling crisis, which will ultimately force default even on a country like Italy with devastating consequences for the euro area as a whole. This lender of last resort needs to have significant firing power to be credible. In principle, such liquidity crises can most easily addressed with the Central Bank and in the short term there may be little other option. However, often liquidity and solvency crises are difficult to distinguish thereby risking a monetary financing of insolvencies. It may therefore be preferable in the long run to rely on a fiscal lender of last resort. Second, the very real and dangerous problem of moral hazard needs to be addressed. Unfortunately, the experience of this summer has documented this risk. The help provided by the ECB for Italy has led to less not more reforms. Third, the integrated euro area banking system needs an integrated and powerful banking supervision and resolution authority backed by enough means to prevent bank runs. The current system centered around national supervisors and national fiscal resources is clearly fragile and bank runs have started in a number of countries.

At the heart of these problems is the absence of a supranational authority. The euro area needs a strong euro area authority that can fulfill these three functions by being able to raise taxes, being strong to veto countries’ economic policies and having enough power and resources to backstop and close banks if necessary. The crisis resolution strategy so far has failed to deliver that. Even worse, by relying on intergovernmental approaches such as the EFSF it has aggravated the situation and increased the veto power of any member state. Thus, the strengthening of an intergovernmental approach has prevented effective solutions by increasing the coordination failure in the euro area.

More and more commentators and even the Polish foreign minister Radoslaw Sikorski are calling for German leadership. The expressed hope is that Germany as the largest and most powerful economy will act in almost a supranational manner to save the euro. The historic dimension of these calls is breath-taking. However, Germany does not have the economic and political ability to save the euro by itself. Economically, German resources are insufficient to back up euro area debt and banks. Politically, German leadership will not be strong and balanced enough to come to an outcome that prevents moral hazard and ensures prosperity in the euro area.

20th century history points to one exclusive possibility of how Germany can exercise leadership: it is within the EU. German leadership therefore now calls for the creation of a strong supra-national euro area authority within the EU. This euro area authority will need to have true federal powers and accordingly national powers will have to be reduced. This will have to include a reduction in the power of national parliaments, including that of the Bundestag. Such a supra-national structure would require treaty changes but it would have the benefit of creating a true coordinator of European policy making. This supra-national authority will also need to derive its legitimacy from a supra-national level. In other words, more democratic legitimacy at the EU level will be important. Ultimately, more Europe will be to the benefit of France, Germany and all the countries of the EU by creating a stable and prosperous economic area that can act on the global scene. Let us hope that our leaders understand the historic dimension of their decisions: releasing power will ultimately increase it.

Guntram B. Wolff is co-author of “What kind of fiscal union?

About the authors

  • Guntram B. Wolff

    Guntram Wolff is a Senior fellow at Bruegel. He is also a Professor of Economics at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB). 

    From 2022-2024, he was the Director and CEO of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and from 2013-22 the director of Bruegel. Over his career, he has contributed to research on European political economy, climate policy, geoeconomics, macroeconomics and foreign affairs. His work was published in academic journals such as Nature, Science, Research Policy, Energy Policy, Climate Policy, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Banking and Finance. His co-authored book “The macroeconomics of decarbonization” is published in Cambridge University Press.

    An experienced public adviser, he has been testifying twice a year since 2013 to the informal European finance ministers’ and central bank governors’ ECOFIN Council meeting on a large variety of topics. He also regularly testifies to the European Parliament, the Bundestag and speaks to corporate boards. In 2020,  ranked him one of the 28 most influential “power players” in Europe. From 2012-16, he was a member of the French prime minister’s Conseil d’Analyse Economique. In 2018, then IMF managing director Christine Lagarde appointed him to the external advisory group on surveillance to review the Fund’s priorities. In 2021, he was appointed member and co-director to the G20 High level independent panel on pandemic prevention, preparedness and response under the co-chairs Tharman Shanmugaratnam, Lawrence H. Summers and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. From 2013-22, he was an advisor to the Mastercard Centre for Inclusive Growth. He is a member of the Bulgarian Council of Economic Analysis, the European Council on Foreign Affairs and advisory board of Elcano. He is also a fellow at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy.

    Guntram joined Bruegel from the European Commission, where he worked on the macroeconomics of the euro area and the reform of euro area governance. Prior to joining the Commission, he worked in the research department at the Bundesbank, which he joined after completing his PhD in economics at the University of Bonn. He also worked as an external adviser to the International Monetary Fund. He is fluent in German, English, and French. His work is regularly published and cited in leading media. 

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